Quantum Malware by Wu, Lian-Ao & Lidar, Daniel A.
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
05
05
12
6v
4 
 2
7 
Ja
n 
20
06
Quantum Malware
Lian-Ao Wu(1) and Daniel A. Lidar(1,2)
(1)Chemical Physics Theory Group, Department of Chemistry,
and Center for Quantum Information and Quantum Control,
University of Toronto, 80 St. George St., Toronto, Ontario, M5S 3H6, Canada
(2)Departments of Chemistry, Electrical Engineering-Systems,
and Physics, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA 90089
When quantum communication networks proliferate they will likely be subject to a new type of
attack: by hackers, virus makers, and other malicious intruders. Here we introduce the concept of
“quantum malware” to describe such human-made intrusions. We offer a simple solution for storage
of quantum information in a manner which protects quantum networks from quantum malware.
This solution involves swapping the quantum information at random times between the network
and isolated, distributed ancillas. It applies to arbitrary attack types, provided the protective
operations are themselves not compromised.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum information processing (QIP) offers unprecedented advantages compared to its classical counterpart1.
Quantum communication is moving from laboratory prototypes into real-life applications. For example, quantum
communication networks (“quantum internet”2) have already been completed, and even commercialized3. Efforts to
protect quantum information flowing through such networks have so far focused on environmental (decoherence)
and cryptographic (eavesdropping) “attacks”. Quantum error correction has been developed to overcome these
disturbances4,5,6.
Malware (a portmanteau of “malicious software”), familiar from classical information networks, is any software
developed for the purpose of doing harm to a computer system7. This includes self-replicating software such as
viruses, worms, and wabbits; software that collects and sends information, such as Trojan horses and spyware; software
that allows access to the computer system bypassing the normal authentication procedures, such as backdoors, and
more. In view of their strategic importance, when quantum information networks become widespread, it is likely that
deliberately designed malware will appear and attempt to disrupt the operation of these networks or their nodes. We
call the quantum version of these types of attacks quantum malware.
Quantum malware is a new category of attacks on quantum information processors. While it shares the “intelligent
design” aspect of eavesdropping in quantum cryptography, one cannot assume that its perpetrators will attempt to
minimally disturb a QIP task. Instead, while quantum malware will try to remain hidden until its scheduled launch,
its attack can be strong and deliberately destructive. Moreover, generally it should be assumed that malware is able
to attack at any point in time and target any component and part of the quantum devices in a quantum network.
Quantum malware may appear in the form of a quantum logic gate, or even as a whole quantum algorithm designed
and controlled by the attackers. In comparison with classical information processing, there are more ways to attack
in QIP, because quantum states contain more degrees of freedom than their classical counterparts.
Here we propose a simple scheme to protect quantum memory in quantum information processors against a wide
class of such malware. This scheme, while not foolproof, dramatically reduces the probability of success of an attack,
under reasonable assumptions, which involve strengthening the defenders relative to the attackers. We note that if
attacker and defender have exactly the same capabilities (including knowledge, e.g., of secret keys), a defense is likely
to be impossible. Therefore, the question becomes, how much must one add to the defenders’ capabilities, or subtract
from the attackers’, in order to have a secure network? The protocol we propose here to defend against quantum
malware provides a possible answer to this question.
II. CAN QUANTUM MALWARE EXIST?
An early no-go theorem showed that it is not possible to build a fixed, general purpose quantum computer which
can be programmed to perform an arbitrary quantum computation8 . However, it is possible to encode quantum
dynamics in the state of a quantum system, in such a way that the system can be used to stochastically perform,
at a later time, the stored transformation on some other quantum system. Moreover, this can be done in a manner
such that the probability of failure decreases exponentially with the number of qubits that store the transformation9.
Such stochastic quantum programs can further be used to perform quantum measurements10,11,12. Thus it is entirely
conceivable that quantum malware can be sent across a quantum information network, stored in the state of one or
2more of the network nodes, and then (stochastically) execute a quantum program or measurement. Either one of these
eventualities can be catastrophic for the network or its nodes. In the case of a maliciously executed measurement
the outcome can be an erasure of all data. In the case of a quantum program one can imagine any number of
undesirable outcomes, ranging from a hijacking of the network, to a quantum virus or worm, which replicates itself
(probabilistically, due to the no-cloning theorem13,14) over the network.
III. QUANTUM MALWARE MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
While there is no limit to the number and character of possible malware attacks, they must all share the same
fundamental characteristic: they comprise a set of elementary operations, “quantum machine-language”, such as
quantum logic gates and measurements. It is this simple observation, which also guided the early concept of the
circuit model of quantum computing15, that allows us to consider a general model of quantum malware, without
resorting to specific modes of attack. We thus model quantum malware at this machine-language level. Clearly,
this captures all “high-level” types of attack, since these must, by necessity, comprise such elementary operations.
The operations can be unitary gates U(t) driven by a time-dependent Hamiltonian H(t), and/or measurements,
taking place while a QIP task is in progress. We denote the series of malicious operations by the superoperator
M˜({|i〉〈j|}⊗K), where |i〉 is an arbitrary basis state in the Hilbert space in which a qubit (one of K) is embedded.
This notation includes measurements, as well as “leakage” operations that couple the two states of any qubit with the
rest of its Hilbert space. For example, M˜({|i〉〈j|}) may have the structure of a quantum completely positive map16.
This captures the most general type of quantum malware possible. The details of such quantum malware operations,
i.e., the structure of M˜({|i〉〈j|}), are in general known only to the attackers, and we will not presume or need any
such knowledge.
In order to protect against malware, in classical information processing one must assume that there is a means by
which to determine, or at least estimate, a time interval δ within which the malware is off, so that malware-free data
can be copied (backed up). For example, when one installs a firewall, or when one applies an anti-virus program,
one must assume that these tasks themselves are malware-free. Similarly, we will assume that the quantum malware
attack occurs in relatively short bursts, and that there are periods during which there is no attack. We note that it
is in the interest of the attackers to remain hidden, or at least not to launch a continuous attack. For, otherwise, the
defenders may simply decide that it is too risky to engage in any kind of activity, thus defeating the purpose of the
attackers.
IV. NETWORK OPERATIONS PROTOCOL
Although the classical backup method is not directly applicable in the case of quantum information – because of
the no-cloning theorem13,14 – the basic idea of assuming malware-off periods while copying suggests an analogous
mechanism for protecting quantum information against quantum malware. We note that the assumption that the
attack is switched off every once in a while is not only reasonable for the sake of the adversary’s purpose of maintaining
an element of surprise, but is common also to quantum cryptography. For example, a probabilistic protocol for
quantum message authentication (essentially a “secure quantum virtual private network”) assumes that the sender
and receiver are not subject to attacks by a third party at least while sending and measuring quantum states17.
The protocol we describe below is deterministic and is designed to protect quantum information over time. The
networks we consider compriseK nodes, which can either be the whole network or a part thereof. Each node contains a
quantum computer. The network is used for the transmission of quantum information. Hence the nodes are connected
via quantum and classical channels. The quantum channels are used for tasks requiring the transmission of quantum
states, such as quantum cryptography18. The classical channels are useful, among other things for teleportation19.
Henceforth, the terms “online”/“offline” applied to a network node mean that this node is connected/unconnected to
the network. The defenders have access to three types of qubits, or quantum computers: (i) Data qubits, which can be
either online or offline; (ii) Decoy qubits, which are online when the data qubits are offline, and vice versa; (iii) Ancilla
qubits, which are always offline. In Table 1 we compare the assumptions we make about the respective capabilities
of the defenders and attackers of the network. With the exception of the limitations listed in Table 1, the attackers
are bound only by the laws of physics. Both defenders and attackers have access to clock synchronization,20, which
enables the defenders to make use of their set of secret network on-times.
One can envision any number of different methods by means of which the task of secure distribution of the network
on-times to the defenders can be accomplished, including classical21,22 and quantum secret sharing protocols23,24,25,
which are procedures for splitting a message into several parts so that no subset of parts is sufficient to read the
message, but the entire set is. It is essential to the success of the protocol that only trusted parties are recipients.
3The secret set {Ti} is stored off-line by the defenders, and is never copied onto a computer that is accessed by the
network. This provision is meant to preclude the attackers from ever gaining access to the times {Ti}, even if at some
point they successfully (remotely) hijack a network node.
Our network protection protocol is given in Figure 1. After the preparatory steps (1) and (2), the protocol cycles
through steps (3)-(6), with the next network on-times {Ti} chosen from the previously distributed secret set. The
protocol is further illustrated in Figure 2.
V. CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESS OF THE DEFENSE PROTOCOL
We note that if a malware attack ever takes place during the network-on times, replacement of data qubits by
decoy qubits, decoy-reset, or SWAP operations, the protocol fails and the network must be completely reset. We can
estimate the probability, p, of this catastrophic occurrence as follows. A reasonable strategy is to pick the times {Ti}
from a uniformly random distribution. The malware designers, on the other hand, may choose their attack interval
times {θj} from some other distribution, not known to us. Let us characterize this latter distribution by a mean
attack interval θ and mean attack length δ. Let the total time over which the protocol above is implemented be T .
Let us also designate the operating times within a single cycle of our protocol by τ (i.e., τ = τO+2τS+ τR). Consider
a particular attack window of length δ at some random time. The probability q1 that the network is off during this
window is q1 = [T − (δ+ τ)]/T , since there are two network-on intervals, one before and one after the attack window,
and each must be a distance τ/2 away from this window. In other words, the excluded interval is δ+2(τ/2). Now, since
the network-on times are randomly distributed, the probability that this same attack window does not overlap any
network-on interval, after M such intervals, is qM ≈ q
M
1 (this is an approximation since one should actually exclude
overlapping intervals26, but if the intervals are sufficiently sparse such overlaps can be neglected). The probability of
at least one (catastrophic) overlap of this attack window with a network-on interval is p = 1− qM . Letting M = cT ,
where 0 < c < 1 is a constant, we have p
T→∞
−→ 1− exp[−c(δ+ τ)], so that as long as c and τ (under our control), and δ
(under the attackers’ control) are sufficiently small, we have p ≈ c(δ + τ) & 0. Another way of analyzing the optimal
strategy is to note that there are, on average, a total of A = T/(θ+ δ) attack intervals, so that the expected number
of catastrophic overlaps is Ap = [T/(θ+ δ)]{1− [1− (δ + τ)/T ]M}, and this number must be ≪ 1 for our protocol to
succeed. Given an estimate of the attackers’ parameters, θ and δ, and given that the state of technology will impose a
minimum τ , we can use this result to optimize T and M . A simple estimate can be derived in the physically plausible
limit δ, τ ≪ T , where we can linearize the above expression and obtain the condition
M ≪ (δ + θ)/(δ + τ). (1)
4FIG. 1: Network operations protocol.
If we further assume τ < δ ≪ θ, we find the intuitively simple result that the number of network-on times cannot
exceed the ratio of the mean attack interval to the mean attack length.
We note that one might suspect that our protocol is in fact more vulnerable than suggested by the arguments above,
given that an adversary might hijack quantum repeaters installed between network nodes and tweak the data (this
scenario assumes quantum optical communication). However, we point out that there exists an alternative scheme
to the use of quantum repeaters: in order to overcome photon decoherence and loss one may use a spatial analog of
the quantum Zeno effect and “bang-bang decoupling”, which involves only linear optical elements installed at regular
5FIG. 2: Schematic of network operations protocol. Depicted in the top six parts is a simple network with K = 2 nodes and one
data qubit in each node. For simplicity we do not depict other parts of quantum computers where the malware would reside.
Parts (1)-(6) denote the first six steps in the protocol, starting from the first network cycle. The green dots (top) are data
qubits, the yellow dots (middle) are ancillas, and the blue dots (bottom) are decoy qubits. Initially (1), the system is offline.
When data qubits are connected by straight lines (2), the system is online. The curly lines (2) represent entangled qubits. The
time at which the network is turned on is random and unknown to the malware makers, and the duration too short for them
to interfere. In the ultrashort step (3) the network is off and the state of data and ancilla qubits is swapped, as represented by
the vertical straight lines. The decoy qubits may be under attack. (4) Decoy qubits are subject to a malware attack. Whatever
the attack, in (5) the data and decoy qubits are reset and the data qubits swapped with the ancilla qubits. Red data qubits
(6) indicate the end of a network cycle, and the start of a new cycle. Bottom part: Timeline of the protocol.
intervals along an optical fiber27. Such a system cannot be hijacked because of its distributed nature. An attacker
could at most remove, or tamper with, some of the linear optical elements, thus degrading the performance of the
quantum noise suppression scheme.
VI. DETECTION OF AN ATTACK, AND INCREASING THE ROBUSTNESS OF THE DEFENSE
PROTOCOL
A considerable improvement in the robustness of the stored quantum information is possible by replacing the SWAP
operation with an encoding of each data qubit into a quantum error-detecting code1. Not only does this enable the
application of quantum fault tolerance methods4, it also allows the defenders to check whether the data has been
modified, via the use of quantum error detection. However, since this does not allow us to change our assumptions
about the relative weakness/strength of attackers and defenders, we do not here consider this possibility in detail.
6We further note that it is possible to slightly relax the assumption that the malware makers cannot interfere during
the real communication step (2). Indeed, it is possible to let the malware attack and/or store itself on another set
of qubits connected to the network, as long as these qubits are not involved in storing the legitimate state being
processed across the network. When executing the short decoy step (3), we must then assume that this other set of
qubits does not interact with the ancillas.
VII. IMPLEMENTATION OF SWAP GATES
We now show how the SWAP gates needed in our protocol can be implemented in a variety of physical systems.
Recall that above we distinguished between malware operating on the qubits’ Hilbert space, and malware that includes
operations on a larger Hilbert space (“leakage”). The implementation of Si for malware M˜({~σid}), where ~σid are the
Pauli matrices on the data qubits id, without leakage, is direct. Assume that the Heisenberg interaction ~σid ·~σia between
the ith data qubit and its ancilla is experimentally controllable, as it is in a variety of solid-state quantum computing
proposals such as quantum dots28. Then the SWAP gate is Si = exp(i
pi
2Pidia), where Pidia =
1
2 (~σid · ~σia + 1) =∑1
α,β=0(|α〉id 〈β|)⊗ (|β〉ia 〈α|) is an operator exchanging between the ith data qubit and its ancilla, and the gate time
τα (α = O,S,R) is on the order of a few picoseconds
29. The SWAP gate can be implemented in a variety of other
systems, with other Hamiltonians, in particular Hamiltonians of lower symmetry30,31.
If the attackers design malware capable of causing leakage into or from the larger Hilbert space with dimension N ,
the situation will be different. Generally, the malware superoperator M˜ is a function of transition operators of the
form |α〉i 〈β|, where the case of α, β > 1 represents states other than the two qubit states |0〉 and |1〉. If both α and
β are 0 or 1, the operation can be expressed in terms of Pauli matrices, e.g., |0〉 〈1| = σx + iσy; if only one of either α
or β is 0 or 1, the operation represents leakage to or from the qubit subspace. Let us define a generalized data-ancilla
exchange operator, Pidia =
∑N−1
α,β=0(|α〉id 〈β|) ⊗ (|β〉ia 〈α|). Then Pidia |α〉id |β〉ia = |β〉id |α〉ia and P
2
idia
= I, the
identity operator. Therefore the generalized SWAP operator is
Si = exp(i
π
2
P
i
d
ia
) = iP
i
d
ia
, (2)
and it follows directly that S†M˜({id})S = M˜({ia}), where S =
∏
i S
†
i . The exchange operator Pidia can be imple-
mented as a controllable two-body Hamiltonian in multi-level systems.
For a fermionic system such as excitonic qubits in quantum dots32,33 or electrons on the surface of liquid helium34, a
qubit is defined as |0〉 = f †0 |vac〉, |1〉 = f
†
1 |vac〉, where f
†
0 , f
†
1 are fermionic creation operators and |vac〉 is the effective
vacuum state (e.g., the Fermi level). The most general attack uses an operator (a Hamiltonian or measurement) that
can be expressed in terms of Fid ≡ (f
†
0,id
)k(f †1,id)
l(f0,id)
m(f1,id)
n (where k, l,m, n are integers) acting on the ith data
qubit. These operators can be shifted to the corresponding ancilla, via control of a two-body fermionic Hamiltonian.
Namely, S†iFidSi = Fia , where the SWAP operator for the ith fermionic particle reads Si = S
0
i S
1
i , where
Sqi = exp[
π
2
(f †q,idfq,ia − f
†
q,ia
fq,id)],
with q = 0, 1. This can be proven easily using the identities
e−φ(f
†
d
fa−f
†
a
fd)f †de
φ(f†
d
fa−f
†
a
fd) = cosφf †d + sinφf
†
a ,
e−φ(f
†
d
fa−f
†
a
fd)fde
φ(f†
d
fa−f
†
a
fd) = cosφfd + sinφfa,
which follow from the Baker-Hausdorff formula e−αABeαA = B−α[A,B]+ α
2
2! [A, [A,B]]− .... The relation S
†
iFidSi =
Fia implies that the action of any “fermionic malware” is shifted by the SWAP gate from the data to the ancilla
particle. The very same construction works also for bosonic systems, such as the linear-optics quantum computing
proposal35. There a qubit is defined as |0〉 = b†0 |vac〉, |1〉 = b
†
1 |vac〉, where b
†
0, b
†
1 are bosonic creation operators.
The relations we have just presented for fermions hold also for bosons, provided one everywhere substitutes bosonic
operators in place of the fermionic ones.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
What sets quantum malware apart from the environmental and eavesdropping attacks is that the latter are typically
weak (in the sense of coupling to the quantum information processing (QIP) device), while the former can be arbitrarily
7strong, can attack at anytime, and can target any part of a quantum device. Indeed, a malicious intruder, intent on
disrupting information flow or storage on a quantum network, will resort to whatever means available. In contrast,
the QIP-environment interaction will be a priori reduced to a minimal level, and an eavesdropper will attempt to go
unnoticed by the communicating parties. For this reason one cannot expect quantum error correction to be of use
against quantum malware, as it is designed to deal with small errors. The same holds true for quantum dynamical
decoupling36 or other types of Zeno-effect like interventions37. Decoherence-free subspaces and subsystems38, on the
other hand, do not assume small coupling, but do assume a symmetric interaction, which is unlikely to be a good
assumption in the case of quantum malware. We further note that of all possible types of quantum malware, as far
as we know only quantum trojan horses have been considered previously, in the quantum cryptography literature. In
particular, in the context of the security proof of quantum key distribution, it was shown that teleportation can be
used to reduce a quantum trojan horse attack to a classical one39. Finally, we note that the attacks we are concerned
with are on the quantum data, not the quantum computer software; the latter is generally itself a list of classical
instructions, and can be cloned.
Experience with classical information processing leaves no doubt that the arrival of quantum malware – malware
designed to disrupt or destroy the operation of quantum communication networks and their nodes (quantum comput-
ers) – is a matter of time. When this happens, overcoming the problem of quantum malware may become as important
as that of overcoming environment-induced decoherence errors. In this work we have raised this specter, and have
offered a relatively simple solution. Our solution invokes a network communication protocol, wherein trusted parties
operate the network at pre-specified times, and quickly swap the information out of the network onto a quantum
backup system. Such a protocol slows the network down by a constant factor, and therefore does not interfere with
any quantum computational speedup that depends on scaling with input size. The success of our protocol depends
strongly on the ability to perform very rapid swapping between data and ancilla qubits. This suggests the importance
of the design of fast and reliable swapping devices. This can be done for a variety of physical systems, as shown above.
As long as the swapping can be done sufficiently fast, and as long as there exists a mechanism for secure distribution
of the network on-times only among trusted parties, we have shown that the quantum network will be unharmed by
a very general model of quantum malware. On the other hand, if these assumptions are not satisfied and an attack
is successful, one must unfortunately reset the network, pending the development of a “quantum anti-virus program”
that would clean infected data. The latter is a very interesting open research problem. Our protocol is similar to
“paranoid” classical protocols employed in military systems that are under attack, which are shut down a great deal
of the time, and then are suddenly opened up in order to perform a useful task. However, there is a distinct quantum
aspect to our protocol, which is that it preserves entanglement across the network. In this sense our protocol, while
being a conceptually simple generalization of established classical methods, offers a genuine step forward towards
quantum network security against quantum malware.
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